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To the Orphaned, Dispossessed, and
Illegitimate Children: Human Rights Beyond
Republican and Liberal Traditions
SIBA N. GROVOGUI*
ABSTRACT
After the Helsinki Accords, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
empire, and the collapse of states in Africa and elsewhere, many in the
West have come to envisage the enforcement of human rights as a practical
matter. Human rights are thus incorporated in normative regimes under
the rubrics of either the rule of law or the responsibility to protect to be
held against the purveyors of violence. I do not discount the normative
underpinnings of the related stands taken today by states and
transnational and national civil society organizations. I wish to insist on
the futility of envisaging human rights merely as legal standards and
norms and on the need to revisit the question of the human on whom
rights are bestowed. The present article is an exercise in historical and
comparative analysis of what human rights meant to Haitian slaves in the
eighteenth century when, as happened in France and the United States,
notions of human rights emanated in a constitutional scheme intended to
protect the newly freed slaves against violence from the prevailing post-
Enlightenment political, economic, and ideological systems-all of which
had been integral to the processes of enslavement. It is my contention that,
like Haitian slaves, anti-colonialists and some postcolonial entities found
liberal human rights schemes to be equally implicated in modern violence
and therefore responded by proposing novel grounds for imagining human
rights outside of the strictures of liberal constitutionalism.
* Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui, professor of international relations theory and
international law at The Johns Hopkins University, holds a PhD from the University of
Wisconsin at Madison. He is the author of Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans:
Race and Self-Determination in International Law (1996) and Beyond Eurocentrism and
Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions (2006). Grovogui is currently
completing manuscripts on human rights and on the genealogy of the "international." He
is also collaborating on a National Science Foundation-funded project on the rule of law
under a World Bank-initiated experiment in Chad focused on an oil and pipeline
development project.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MORALITY AND POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The ubiquity of "human rights" as an indication of good governance
is the culmination of a historic drive that began at the end of World War
II with the 1948 Human Rights Convention. For valid reasons, many in
the West have come to regard the institutionalization of human rights
as merely a practical matter of enforcement.' This has been the case
since the Helsinki Accords, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
empire, the democratic transition in Latin America, and the failure of
autocratic states in Africa and the Balkans. Accordingly, human rights
should be merely incorporated into normative liberal regimes under
rubrics, such as the rule of law, and enjoined with obligations such as
the responsibility to protect victims of violence and to prosecute
violators. Since the Helsinki Accords, particularly after the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc, humanitarian interventions have since
emerged as the primary instrument to fulfilling the first goal, while
prosecution before national, international, and mixed judicial instances
have become venues for the second goal.
The moral underpinnings of the related policies and positions should
not be discounted. Furthermore, no one should necessarily doubt the
sincerity of the purveyors of these norms: liberal states as well as
national and transnational civil societal groups. Aside from producing
and securing the status of human rights as the indispensable value of
modern life, these human rights advocates have been instrumental in
sensitizing publics to the corrosive effects of extreme violence on and in
international life. As such, they have helped set modern governance on
sound legal, political, and moral foundations. Yet, even at this moment
of celebration, a number of events threaten the apparent progress in the
discourses and practices of human rights. Among them is the tendency
of policymakers, diplomats, and academics, particularly in the West, to
both envisage human rights as mere legal standards originating from
Europe and the West and to assume that the related norms have been
refined through their successful incorporations into constitutional
orders.
Thus, whatever their merits, legitimizations of human rights as
conceived in the West have been suffused with less meritorious claims:
that the present situation vindicates Western positions at the United
Nations; that civil and political rights take precedence over social and
economic rights; that Western institutions of human rights are uniquely
endowed with universal properties whereas others are not; and that
1. See generally Michael Ignatieff, Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is
Theirs to Spread?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
06/26/magazine/26EXCEPTION.html.
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non-Western idioms protecting human faculties and capacities are
simply localized translations of the more universal Western language of
human rights. The result is a mistaken resistance to the very possibility
that African, Asian, or "indigenous" American or Australian values have
been, or may yet be, generative of distinct but equally valid conceptions
of human rights.2 The related arguments are not only mistaken in their
substance, but they also err in assuming that the persistence of Western
conceptions in public debates warrant consideration of the underlying
claims described above. Sadly, this latter point is not a truism; it is a
result of politics in which power and power relations affect all
deliberations in international discourse. The effect of the West's power
is magnified by an existential affinity between analyses that combine
tenets of natural history with historicist representations of conflicts and
authoritative or neo-imperial rationalizations of intervention in conflict
zones where antagonists can be depicted as barbarians and their
"victims" as innocent and defenseless.3
For these reasons, the centrality of the West and its conceptions of
human rights persist as a matter of fact to some and as a question to
others. As to the former, valuable retrospectives on the origins of
Western notions of human rights have quickly devolved in two
unfortunate directions. The initial path, exemplified by such scholars as
varied in their disciplines as Louis Henkin 4 and Anthony Pagden,5 is a
deliberate but misguided discursive slippage from establishing the
"origins of Western notions" to one of the "Western origins" of human
rights. This slippage often occurs when the point of origin for human
rights looks back to the birth of natural rights theory6 or to its
theological antecedents that rebuked missionaries and other cruel
adventurers, examples of which can be found in the impassioned
writings of clergymen like Bartholeme de Las Casas.7
From admiration for individuals like Las Casas comes a second
path, which involves the tendency to attribute purer motives to liberal
predecessors of human rights and to grant their views universal
2. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS
POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 58-59 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2003). But see JIRGEN HABERMAS, THE
DIVIDED WEST 35 (Ciaran Cronin ed., trans., Polity Press 2006) (2004).
3. See Anthony Pagden, Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe's Imperial
Legacy, 31 POL. THEORY 171, 191-92 (2003).
4. LOUIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
5. Pagden, supra note 3.
6. See id. at 192.
7. E.g., BARTOLOMe DE LAS CASAS, AN AccouNT, MUCH ABBREVIATED, OF THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES 2-4 (Franklin W. Knight ed., Andrew Hurley trans., Hackett
Publishing 2003) (1552).
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application.8 These embedded universalist views have received little
attention due to conjectures created by the rise of Europe-through
conquest, imperialism, and colonialism-when the institutionalization
of Western conceptions of human rights were integral dimensions of
protectorates, mandates, and trusteeships. During this time, human
rights discourses were authoritative commands implemented through
administrative fiats presented as befitting the conditions of their
enactments. Accordingly, the discourses and policies of human rights
were, by their nature, uninviting of reflection, dissent, and challenge.
Therefore, it is not paradoxical that the rigidity born of authority and
command invited defiance and retrenchment among anti-colonialists
and known relativists for whom institutional developments were not
merely a matter of directives but of contestation. From this latter
perspective, the concept of human rights is foremost a historical
referent born of necessity and, thus, one that has practical ends.
This article posits that multiple genealogies of human rights have
existed in the modern world and those that have the greatest appeal
to-and in-the Global South are not the ones often emanating from the
West. This is why the centrality of the West at the inception of human
rights and its presumed universality do not appear as given here.
Rather, the Western notion of human rights appears as a set of
affirmations, interrogations, and disputations. Enlightenment thought
and the attendants of its traditions proceeded centrally by generating
conceptions of subjects and life that spread to vast swaths of the earth,
each magnified in territory and intensity by European imperialism,
colonization, and colonialism.9 For the same reasons, post-
Enlightenment and post-Revolutionary British, French, and U.S. liberal
entities-from radical thinkers, abolitionists, and philanthropists to
today's human rights professionals-played crucial roles in
promulgating particular forms and understandings of rights that also
acquired hegemonic status, commensurate with the powers of those
states in the world. Therefore, these entities' formulations of rights were
undeniably and uniquely Western.
Yet, the West was not unique in its ambition to ennoble human
existence. Nor was the West alone in envisaging moral categories and
enforceable standards for the protection of what was emerging in the
political and moral economies of the eighteenth century as the essential
faculties and capacities of human beings. Notwithstanding the
8. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 18-21
(1st ed. 1998); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 39-78 (1998).
9. See, e.g., BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COLONIAL
DISCOURSES OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN AFRICAN HISTORY (2007).
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important role liberal states and Western professionals and academics
played in the promotion of historic institutions of human rights, their
proposed categories have long competed with other compelling, although
non-hegemonic, conceptions of human rights. In this sense, Western
categories are neither historically unique nor morally indispensable to
an ethical life. Every imaginable duty and obligation in the area of
human rights may be validated and defended by most of the world's
moral systems, even if they have different inflection and, therefore,
legal, political, and moral implications than the Western conception.
In what follows, two inescapable questions emerge. The first
pertains to claims of the uniqueness and indispensability of Western
categories to modern institutional developments regarding human
rights. The second question relates to the indispensability of Western
categories of human rights to the conception and implementation of the
related obligations-like the responsibility to protect-and duties-such
as the prosecution of human rights abusers. In this regard, two
propositions are advanced. First, non-Western legal and moral systems
do-and have provided-sufficient or equally compelling rationales for
the idea of enforceable rights to protect humans, which may be extended
to include a responsibility to protect victims and a duty to prosecute
violators. Second, human rights-related obligations and duties can be
defended without conceding the universality and conclusiveness of
Western ideas and practices of human rights. However, alternative
conceptions of enforceable edicts may not allow for the kinds of
hierarchies of rights imagined by liberals, particularly in regard to so-
called civil and political rights, on the one hand, and those termed socio-
cultural and economic, on the other. Put succinctly, the idea that
Western conceptions of human rights are exclusively universal and that
conceptions from other regions are simply a cultural or geographic-
inflection on Western sensibilities is inaccurate.
In addition to the fallacy of the universality of Western conceptions
of human rights, the idea that human rights categories have a discrete
chronology in which civil and political rights appear as first generation
rights, followed by second and third generations of rights applicable to
economic and finally cultural categories is myopic. Not surprisingly, this
chronology reflects the order in which these classes of rights have been
incorporated, or not, in Western constitutional orders. But this
chronology cannot be aptly grafted onto other traditions of human
value. Any attempt to superimpose this chronology on other traditions
results in political and moral imaginaries of the subjects of rights that
obscure provincial origins.
The central thesis of this article is that notions of human rights
emerged historically as linguistic devices prescribing social relations.
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These notions are at once indeterminate in meaning and convergent in
purpose in that human rights advocates utilize them in their struggles
for freedom and justice. In short, human rights reflect regional and
temporal concerns related to the necessities of life. From this
perspective, the concept of human rights contains cultural and historical
notions of the human, of human faculties, and of the requirements of
public and private lives.
None of the above should be surprising. This article's contribution,
however, is a historical and comparative analysis of what human rights
meant to Haitian slaves in the dawn of the Haitian Revolution from
1791-1804. Like the constitutional revolutions in France between 1789-
1799 and the United States between 1764-1789, notions of human rights
were intended to protect the citizens in whose name rights were
declared. However, in Haiti, the "new" citizens had not been formerly
considered human; they were newly-freed slaves asserting their
humanity against violence from the prevailing post-Enlightenment
political, economic, and ideological systems-all of which had been
integral to the processes of enslavement. This was new. A richer
historical account of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
demonstrates that Haitian slaves and, later, anti-colonialists and some
postcolonial entities found that liberal human rights were concomitant
with capitalism and expansionist state systems. Thus, the Western
tradition of human rights has been profoundly implicated in the same
kinds of violence by thugs, private armies, and agents of state and
capital that advocates of human rights today wish to eliminate.
Fulfilling the universalist promise of the "rights revolution" will then
require novel grounds for imagining traditions and new boundaries for
the human well outside the strictures of liberal constitutionalism and
republicanism. A retrospective on the Haitian revolution serves here as
a point of departure.
II. BEGINNINGS, TRIALS, AND TRIBULATIONS
As conceived in the West, human rights took hold of political
thought and institutional design during social upheaval provoked by the
prior social system's failure to adequately protect society against the
violent uncertainty of the modern state system, its underlying political
economy, and associated ethical forms. From this perspective, France,
the United States, and Haiti present an interesting comparative
analysis. Among them, they shared post-Enlightenment social
upheavals brought about by the effect of scientific and technological
discoveries; the tri-continental Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, albeit from
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different positions; and the rejections of all political, moral, and legal
orthodoxies pertaining to government.
For what they shared, these countries also differed in their
conceptions of constitutional subjects and therefore the meaning of the
human and of rights. France alone was a state at the time of revolution,
one under transition from absolutism. The U.S. revolutionaries were
slave-owning British subjects inhabiting dependencies held under the
authority of the British monarchy. Haitian revolutionaries were a black
majority in French dependency ruled directly from France, but through
a local elite group of French and Mulatto citizens. While French and
U.S. revolutionaries were whites directly connected to empire and its
political economy, Haitian slaves held the same status as that of the
U.S. slaves incorporated in the United States Constitution: less-than-
human. On the other hand, the French did not experience slavery and
life in slave-society in the same manner as their U.S. counterparts, who
directly managed their slaves and held them in bondage within their
own territory and therefore in close proximity. Nor would the French
have had direct knowledge of slave society in the manner that those in
the United States might have, as the latter intermingled with their
slaves, with all that implies.
In these contexts, revolutions and constitutional innovations
transformed societies. Thus, the French Revolution affected not only the
rights of the new citizens, but also social and political life on the island
of Espafiola, which in turn affected U.S. sensibilities toward slavery.
The same could be said of the American Revolution, which affected
British government and society and even the organization of the British
Empire. The Haitian Revolution, however, transformed not only the
image of the slave in all three countries, but also throughout the
colonial world. Finally, because of their connections to and location in
the empire, all three revolutions had worldwide implications. They
concurrently engaged virtually every segment of society, from the slave
to the slave owner to the businessman or professional. From this
standpoint, members of society at large were the foot soldiers of the
revolutions, but the instigators and agents of these revolutions were
select individuals. Here lies another constitutive difference among the
three revolutions. In France, the revolutionaries were united under the
Third Estate, the representative body of the people as opposed to the
nobility and the monarchy at the time of the revolution. Although this
Third Estate was led by the likes of Abbe Siyes, the instigators entered
history as Jacobins and Girondins, highly organized and politicized
segments of the population often divided by ideology. In the United
States, the agents of revolution were the middle class: among them,
land and slave owners, businessmen, scientists, legal and other
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professionals, and educators. In Haiti, the instigators of the revolution
were not only local elites, but also a class of newly-enslaved Africans
known as the Congo.' 0
These sets of agents envisaged three distinct categories of political
subjects born of the revolutions: in France, the citizen; in the United
States, the individual; and in Haiti, the human person. The primary
difference among these subjects lies in their political associations. In
France, political ideology and identification preceded the constitutional
order. As a result, the primary and central concern of deliberation was
the nature of citizenship-or the relationship among citizens- on the
one hand, and between the governed and the governor, on the other.
These were defined in constitutional terms that would mutate over
time. In the United States, the political subject was an enterprising,
self-confident, and self-indulgent individual who desired to protect his
activities and assets from the state and the police. The prohibition
against state encroachment was so absolute that the U.S. Constitution
designated the individual as the Third Sovereign, with whom all powers
not granted to the federal government or the state reside. As seen in the
Bill of Rights, the power of the individual was not merely against the
police state; it also kept the moral powers of the state at bay-at least
until the Civil War settled the question of slavery. On the other hand, in
Haiti, the slave was outside prior constitutional relations and, therefore,
outside the legal protections afforded society and political subjects.
Here, the moralization of the political economy and public life on behalf
of human beings was most essential. The aim of the Haitian
Constitution was therefore to include the natural child, the orphan,
divorced and abandoned women, and all other natural human beings
into the constitutional order to ensure them the resources necessary to
sustain life.
It is clear then that the citizen, the individual, and even the alter-
constitutional person of post-slavery did not exhaust what it meant to
be human. The human also had scientific, moral, and legal significance
during these revolutionary times. The intellect was said to be subject to
perfection through education. It enabled reason, which was once
attached either to evolutionary stages or cultural factors. Reason itself
was associated with virtues-for instance, diligence and perseverance-
and vices-intemperance and desire for power-associated with the
flesh.
The historical record clearly shows that the initial constitutional
norms that the French revolutionaries favored set into motion a political
10. ICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, SILENCING THE PAST: POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF
HISTORY 40 (1995).
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aesthetic that promoted attachment to an ideal of the nation as a public
culture of solidarity within a well-defined republic. Hence, the
composition of the Third Estate as the politically relevant political
space, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
("the Universal Declaration"), the abolition of the monarchy, the
institution of the republic, and the mandate to educate endowed citizens
with historic powers in public life, but also obligated citizens to assume
responsibility for the quality of the public order. This division of the
public space and politics was dissimilar to what came into being in the
United States, where the private vices of slavery and violence against
native populations were protected under federalism as constitutional
practices."
Unlike France, the U.S. constitutional order afforded the individual
with protection of the faculties that were considered more centrally
connected to the pursuit of science and industry, including individual
reason and rationality, without regard to other more intangible faculties
such as solidarity. Therefore, in the Bill of Rights, the first orders of
rights are those connected to speech and thought-as protected in the
First Amendment-and the right to protect oneself against the
impositions of the state-as in the Second Amendment's right to bear
arms.
As seen in these examples, Enlightenment-era understandings of
''man" in France and the United States informed the imagination of
constitutions and their requirements as principles and norms of public
life. It is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the knowledge and
traditions that affected the final forms of the respective constitutional
orders. Indeed, philosophy questioned the composition of these faculties
decades and even centuries earlier. As in theology and practice,
philosophy posited that these faculties and the capacities they enable
and enhance do not flow independently from one another. To Thomas
Aquinas, for instance, the virtues of the speculative faculties were not
merely that they enabled considerations of truth, but also that they
advanced understanding, for they were the very foundations of
wisdom.12 From another perspective, too, it may be plausibly argued
that the intellect, through thinking and imagination, allows the
11. This is not the space to articulate a view on the politics of slavery, but I wish to
argue here that the U.S. republic was built around formal compromises (from the Three-
Fifths Clause to the Missouri Compromise) and informal understanding (limiting for
instance the reach of the federal government into questions of slavery) that created a
permissive climate in slave-owning states which was itself affirmed by United States
Supreme Court rulings such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. THOMAS AQUINAS, THOMAS AQUINAS: SELECTED WRITINGS 60 (Ralph McInerny ed.,
trans., Penguin Books 1999) Thomas Aquinas would say that wisdom and understanding
are habits or virtues of the intellect as well as gifts of the Holy Spirit. See id.
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individual to rise above experience to envision new possibilities or
alternative social orders. Along those same lines, Immanuel Kant,
among others, postulated that all humans share sensory faculties and,
thus, are equally susceptible to more general and practical morality and
politics. Finally, even Thomas Hobbes was of the opinion that "[m]an's
nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of
nutrition, motion, generation, sense, [and] reason .... For these powers
we do unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of
man, under these words, animal and rational."13
Philosophers like Hobbes erred in many of their speculations on
human nature and the faculties, particularly in regard to the lower
castes of their own societies and the so-called natives of empire.
Although these thinkers are not responsible for the enacted
constitutional orders and state policies abroad, they nonetheless provide
valuable windows into the general state of thought and the development
and use of thought in their times. Beginning in the seventeenth century,
many discussed these variations in terms of race. According to Robert
Bernasconi, "Kant played a crucial role in establishing the term 'race' as
the currency within which discussions of human variety would be
conducted in the nineteenth century."14 To be sure, Kant was not the
first to use the term; the credit for that goes to Francois Bernier, who
used it in his 1684 essay entitled, A New Division of the Earth,
According to the Different Species or Races of Men who Inhabit It.15
From then until the eighteenth century, the use of race as a
classificatory system was inconsistent.
By the eighteenth century, philosophers and other social theorists
found that significant variations existed within human nature. Many
hoped to provide guidance to policymakers on the basis of their findings.
Accordingly, Francis Galton admonished his contemporaries to
guard against taking our own instincts of what is best
and most seemly, as a criterion for the rest of mankind.
The instincts and faculties of different men and races
differ in a variety of ways almost as profoundly as those
of animals in different cages of the Zoological Gardens;
and however diverse and antagonistic they are, each
13. THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 21 (J.C.A. Gaskin
ed., Oxford Uni. Press 1999) (1650).
14. Robert Bernasconi, Introduction to 1 CONCEPTS OF RACE IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY, at viii (Robert Bernasconi ed., 2001).
15. Id. at vii (translating the title of Francois Bernier, Nouvelle division de la Terre,
pour les differdntes espices ou races d'hommes qui l'habitent, 12 JOURNAL DES SCAVANS
133 (1684)).
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may be good of its kind. It is obviously so in brutes; the
monkey may have a horror at the sight of a snake, and a
repugnance to its ways, but a snake is just as perfect an
animal as a monkey.' 6
By this logic, the living world consisted of an endless variety of elements
that "have grown, body and soul, through selective influences into close
adaptation to their contemporaries, and to the physical circumstances of
the localities they inhabit." 17 Yet, Galton warned that it would be "the
very reverse of improvement to make all its members assimilate to a
common type." Rather, he continued, "we are justified in roundly
asserting that the natural characteristics of every human race admit of
large improvement in many directions easy to specify." 18 Specifically,
"the moral and intellectual faculties . .. are so closely bound up with the
physical ones that these must be considered as well."19 Premises like
this influenced James Lorimer, first president of the Royal Society of
International Law, and advisors to the British government. In a now
classic 1883 treatise, Lorimer advised Britain to extend diplomatic
recognition and immunities on the basis of ethnographic knowledge-
findings of physical anthropology-accounting for the different
achievements of civilization in Asia, the Mahomedan World, Africa, and
the New World. 20
These views found their way into public debates in an age of
revolutions, particularly among the French and U.S. citizens who were
concerned with the proper place of slaves in society and slavery in the
constitutional order. French revolutionaries hastened to abolish slavery
at the early hours of their movement on the principle of liberty, only to
have that decision reversed under Napoleon, who restored slavery in the
interest of empire and racial superiority. Not a revolutionary himself,
the French aristocrat and writer Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau later
captured the mood of the moment with systematic race theory. 21 His
theory is exemplary of nineteenth century historical debates that serve
16. FRANcIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 2-3
(1883).
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATION: A TREATISE OF THE
JuRAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES (Edinburgh, William Blackwood
& Sons 1883-1884).
21. See generally ARTHUR DE GOBINEAU, THE INEQUALITY OF HUMAN RACES (Adrian
Collins trans., Howard Fertig ed. 1967) (1853) (analyzing and comparing the traits of the
various human races and attempting to trace them back through their development to
their historical origins; the original French work was written in the mid-19th century).
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as a point of reference for thinking through the relations of modernity,
racism, and Western discourses about other people.22 Across the ocean,
the Three-Fifths Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Dred Scott
decision, and the quotidian application of cruel and unusual
punishment, among others, to slaves and their descendants point to the
degree to which white revolutionaries and their descendants relied on
race as determinant of humanity.
In sum, the French and U.S. constitutional orders contained certain
ideas of "man," specific models of private and public lives, and finite
views of different peoples and their aptitudes. These ideas, models, and
views shaped the substance, essence, and nature of the legal
dispositions imposed on citizens or required of individuals as a matter of
constitutional justice. The underlying jurisprudence would evolve over
time only as a result of social revolts, civil wars, and other political and
ideological developments.
III. WILL, ATTRIBUTION, AND GUT
In Society Must Be Defended, Michel Foucault maintains that,
notwithstanding flaws in Hobbes' views of human faculties, the
Englishman deserves credit for envisioning that while there are
differences in the strength and ability of persons, such differences are
"insufficient differences" and people are essentially equal; moreover,
such differences allow for the temptation of the strong to prey on the
weak and the inclination of the weak to revolt.23 This temptation of the
strong to prey was in full display in the construction of empire. During
this time, however, the violence was in the names of civilization and
progress, two core justifications of human rights. Again, it is this
association of progress with human rights that requires a re-
examination of the texts and practices associated with the ideas of state,
sovereignty, and security. In this regard, Foucault's observations on
Hobbes might be complemented with other readings. To the extent that
an inherent human nature may be asserted and humans might be said
to be equal in their faculties, Hobbes ascribed man's primary impulse to
"an involuntary will" rooted in desire, appetite and the corresponding
concepts of fear that bind all individuals in any locality, including the
22. See generally Bernasconi, supra note 14 (discussing scientific theories of race
nineteenth century America and Europe, as well as their influence on contemporaneous
social institutions).
23. Michel Foucault, Lecture (Feb. 4, 1976), in "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED":
LECTURES AT THE COLLtGE DE FRANCE 87, 90-91 (Mauro Bertani et al. eds., David Macey
trans., Picador 2003) (1997).
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commonwealth. 24 This attribution connects human faculties-fear,
insecurity, greed, and the appetite for power-to the temporal
constitution of the political body in space, or territory. 25 Hobbes, his
contemporaries, and followers seldom condemned private passions in
the public realm if such an expression resulted in violence against
others who were politically insignificant.
Overall, the distinction between the natural body and the political
body-or the transition from the one to the other-allowed Hobbes and
others to justify a modicum of arbitrariness as this was indicative of the
order that they endorsed. Yet, Hobbes was conscious that the
malleability and openness of the violence of the transition was a threat
to society if the purveyors of violence were national, religious,
indigenous, or now racial minorities who may be mistaken in their
moral justifications and social ends relating to the constitutional order.
In fact, Hobbes did not believe that the poor and the racial other could
be moved to public or political action for the same reasons and on
similar grounds as the reigning European sovereigns or the powerful
clergymen, nobles, and lords who were connected to them. Like a
majority of his contemporaries, Hobbes might have imagined that the
poor and racial other lacked the temperament, science, rationality, and,
therefore, justifiable reason for political action. National, religious,
indigenous, and racial minorities were generally thought to act on the
gut alone-a basic visceral or emotional part of a person that can lead to
alarming feelings or intuitions that must be repelled for the sake of
political or constitutional order. This is not to say that Hobbes thought
that the poor and racial other lacked justification for their actions, only
that the justification was irrational. This position enjoyed the air of
common sense in post-Enlightenment theory and philosophy in which
justification was not a conceptual component of knowledge, at least not
one that related to epistemology. Believing slaves to lack the reason of
Kant or the eloquence of Thomas Jefferson, Maximilien Robespierre, or
Georges Danton, respectable theorists and philosophers could not-or
would not-grant the latter the possibility of generating other reason or
rationale for their actions. The distribution of reason and rationality
according to race was mistaken as the gut emotion, and other psychic
factors, like intuition, remained central to political action.
There are many problems associated with the introduction of the
gut or intuition as dimensions of knowledge and politics. But the gut
proposed here originates in revulsion against injustice: slaves' sense
that their respective constitutional orders had inflicted on them, not
24. C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 32-38 (Penguin
Books 1968) (1651).
25. Id.
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freedom, but its parody; not liberty, but abuse; and not humanity, but
inhumanity. Response from this visceral register, as seen earlier, is in
fact the source from which flow all thought, reason, action, and wisdom.
Again, per Hobbes and others, power and the economy of power-
particularly its abuse-was likely to set off a visceral and emotional
desire to destroy power, the instruments of power, and its rationales. 26
From this perspective, the French reversal on the initial abolition of
slavery and the terms of the U.S. Constitution galvanized the
determination of slaves to achieve freedom in the trans-Atlantic world.
So, it was
the people of Hayti [sic], who have legally constituted us
faithfully organs and interpreters of their will, in
presence of the Supreme Being, before whom all
mankind are equal, and who has scattered so many
species of creatures on the surface of the earth for the
purpose of manifesting his glory and his power by the
diversity of his works, in the presence of all nature by
whom we have been so unjustly and for so long a time
considered as outcast children slaves
declared that this Haitian Constitution was "the free spontaneous and
invariable expression of our hearts, and the general will of our
constituents."27 While the emotional origins of the Haitian Constitution
were the grounds of its apparent marginalization in rationalist-inflected
liberal historiography, 28 it certainly had no monopoly on visceral
response. One need only recall Jefferson's emotive condemnation of
King George III in the United States Declaration of Independence or the
literal decapitation of the French monarchy, which were instances
where the gut mixed with revolutionary calculation for the survival of
the new republics.
The decapitation of empire, monarchy, and the slave master figured
literally and metaphorically in late-eighteenth century revolutions. But
it was French and U.S. slaves' ambition to free themselves of their
sovereign oppressor-the constitutionally-mandated white oppressor-
and oppressing sovereign-the state-that provoked angst in France
26. On want and effect of absolute power, see, for example, THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 22, 363-65 and passim (Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
27. 1805 HAITI CONST. pmbl., translated in Bob Corbett, Haiti: 1805 Constitution, BOB
CORBETT'S HOME PAGE, http://www.webster.edul-corbetre/haitilhistory/earlyhaitill805-
const.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (transcribing an 1805 translation of the constitution,
translator unknown).
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and the United States where it was thought that the slave revolution
was an unrestrained and unreasoned response that could not have
occurred without external stimuli or agitation. To be brief, members of
the French Assembly and the U.S. Congress ascribed mostly animal
characteristics, including instinctual behavior, to slaves. For these
reasons and others, they saw freed slaves as a danger to so-called free
society. Few gave time and thought to the possibility that a new
aesthetic of freedom, with its own substance and essence, was emerging
among Haitian slaves that could be, and in fact would be, different from
those emanating from France and the United States. The primary
concern in France, as in the United States, was to prevent the spread of
the Haitian situation to similar regions.
The non-reflexivity of political theory also stood in the way of
illuminating the achievements of the Haitian Revolution. Among
students of revolutions, for instance, it was held as a philosophical and a
historical fact that the intuitions and gut sensations of white
revolutionaries were steeped deep in Enlightenment thought and that,
as a result, these men possessed reason and rationality, science and
technology, and morality and ethics. Even without stipulating it, in
practice, the reverse common sense applied to slaves in revolt in any
country. Few humanists, philosophers, or social scientists entertained
the possibility of different relations to and, therefore, understandings of
the Enlightenment and its modes of government among slaves. As
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Sibylle Fischer, and Sydney Mintz have all
concluded, 29 the generations of social scientists and humanists that
followed have not done much better at understanding the constitutional
order in Haiti and how its nature, substance, and essence might be
distinct from those of the United States and France.
IV. HUMAN FACULTIES, "ANIMALITY," AND RIGHTS
Modernity's common sense is firmly rooted in Enlightenment
reflections. Hence, constitutionalism was held to proceed from reason,
morality, and ethics. Science, technology, and rationality also flow from
29. SIBYLLE FISCHER, MODERNITY DISAVOWED 273 (2004) (arguing that reductionist
and empiricist historical studies of Haiti have resulted in contradictions and gaps in our
knowledge of the "historical landscape," thus requiring a critical approach that
incorporates more reflective and narrative records and accounts to compensate);
TROUILLOT, supra note 10, at xix (arguing that the historical record is shaped by unequal
access to the means of producing historical narratives); Sidney W. Mintz, Can Haiti
Change?, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 73 (1995) (discussing Haiti's ongoing crisis as "historical" and
describing how a lack of understanding of Haiti's history has led to the creation and
implementation of plans for Haiti-for instance repeated American political
interventions-that are ultimately ineffective).
56 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
the faculties associated with the former. In this light, progress depended
on suppressing the "animal" in humans, as if to eliminate all recessive
natural inclinations from human life. It followed that French and U.S.
constitutionalism set to delineate private morality, passions, and
inclinations from public ones. From this perspective, it was the duty and
obligation of the sovereign to define the public space, and, therefore,
sovereign privileges and immunities, such that they did not encroach on
the private capacities for industry, science, commerce, and social
reproduction. In France, the Third Estate, having declared itself
sovereign, left it to generations of citizens to define their own relations
to the public good. In the United States, the experience of an abusive
sovereign imprinted on social consciousness a deep suspicion of the state
that is reflected in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution.
The above suggests that the contexts and conditions before
revolution differed greatly in the United States, France, and Haiti. In
France, the Universal Declaration sought to exhaust the public life of
man as citizen and to endow the citizen with the means to realize its
humanity in the form apparent in its title and stipulated in the
concurrent French Constitution. In the United States, the constitutional
subject was an individual seeking to emancipate himself from political
and social tutelage through specific sets of rights. These particular civil
and political rights corresponded to particular historical needs and the
corresponding model of society and the constitutional order. The advent
of the individual signaled an aspiration to a particular form of
constitutional life. Accordingly, the U.S. Constitution did aspire to
protect all human faculties, given that the attendant rights were based
on a hierarchy of these faculties, again with the aim of enhancing the
particular human capacities for fields like industry, science, and
commerce. The same could be said of the citizen, that self-asserting
sovereign who aspired to endow himself with the means to realize
himself as a universal model of self-government. Here again, to be a
citizen was to be human in very specific capacities.
The model of the human, and therefore of freedom, that originated
in Haiti resonated in Africa with pre-Cartesian and pre-Enlightenment
Western traditions, but not in modern Europe and the European
dependencies of the New World. It is not hyperbole to venture that, in
these spaces, reformers and revolutionaries were as attentive to defects
in Western constitutional forms as were Haitian slaves in rejecting the
conditions of their own oppression. In both instances, the objectionable
conditions included, but not exclusively, moral and legal discourses that
either negated or diminished their own humanity. Indeed, whether they
combated imperialism, colonialism, or merely engaged in postcolonial
contentions with the West, these entities sought to modify both the
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language of the human and the politics of right to their own advantage.
In such instances, they did not view as mere paradox or contradiction
the fact that France and the United States excluded slaves from the
provisions of their own constitutions. Rather, the striking fact is that
the French and U.S. constitutional orders placed the slaves in the
natural order somewhere between an animal and a human, but not fully
human. They could be traded, branded, and dispensed with at will. It
follows that the terms of the Universal Declaration and the Bill of
Rights did not apply to the slave: an entity not disposed to reason,
industry, or morality and, therefore, needing no freedom of speech, the
right to bear arms, the right to self-government, and other similar
rights.
It is indeed compelling to vast majorities of humanity that, to
become constitutionally human, Haitian slaves turned to the
instruments of revolt, revolution, and rebellions.30 Admirably, Haiti
revolutionaries strove to achieve core moral goals not unlike those in
France and the United States: to legally constitute themselves as
faithful organs and interpreters of their own will, and to do so "in
presence of the Supreme Being, before whom all mankind are equal."3'
Already in this preamble emerges a new understanding of the human
for whom a new freedom was to be proclaimed based on new conceptions
of morality and society-all of which were inscribed in the Haitian
Constitution. Like their revolutionary counterparts elsewhere, Haitian
slaves could rise above experience to envision a new order of things for
natural children, divorced women, new freemen, and all other natural
human beings in communion with nature and natural resources.
In these and other regards, Haitians subverted the entire societal
order inherited from the Enlightenment. The first instance was the
proclamation that "[a]ll acception [sic] of colour among the children of
one and the same family, of whom the chief magistrate is the father,
being necessarily to cease, the Haytians shall hence forward be known
only by the generic appellation of Blacks."32 This article has two clauses,
both of which converge toward the abolition of racial distinction but
30. This history, like others narrated in this space, are obviously more complex than
they appear in this space. For further readings on the Haitian revolution, see, for
instance, DAVID PATRICK GEGGUS, HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY STUDIES (2002); GREGOIRE ET
LA CAUSE DES NoIRs (1789-1831) (Yves Bdnot & Marcel Dorigny eds., 2000); STEWART R.
KING, BLUE COAT OR POWDERED WIG: FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
SAINT-DOMINGUE (2001); JEAN-DANIEL PIQUET, L'EMANCIPATION DES NoIRs DANS LA
REVOLUTION FRANCAISE (1789-1795) (2002); CLAUDE WANQUET, LA FRANCE ET LA
PREMIERE ABOLITION DE L'ESCLAVAGE 1794-1802: LE CAS DES COLONIES ORIENTALES ILE DE
FRANCE (MAURICE) ET LA REUNION (1998).
31. 1805 HAITI CONST. pmbl.
32. Id. art. 14.
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have different juridical and moral effects. This article mandates that the
inhabitants of Haiti be generically called "black." This may strike one as
odd, but, in actuality, the gesture was meant to upend the racial
hierarchies underlying the system of plantation slavery. It was indeed
revolutionary given the racial ideologies of the time to postulate "black"
as an identity like any other and subsequently to apply it to all,
regardless of their family background. In this manner, "black" became a
symbol around which to organize national solidarity and public life.
As a result, "black" thus was not an exclusionary category. As
stipulated by the Constitution, "[t]he Citizens of Hayti are brothers at
home; equality in the eyes of the law is incontestably acknowledged, and
there cannot exist any titles, advantages, or privileges, other than those
necessarily resulting from the consideration and reward of services
rendered to liberty and independence."33 In short, by this constitutional
gesture, the black majority welcomed all others to rejoice in the identity
of the majority. E pluribus unum: of many colors, black!34
To be sure, there may be many moral objections to the position,
including the discomfort of the once racially privileged at being identified
as black. Still, the post-revolutionary Haitian position on race was by far
the single most progressive racial ideology of its time. The act was intended
to break the stranglehold that white racism had had on the island. The
Constitution specifically stipulated that "[n]o whiteman of whatever nation
he may be, shall put his foot on this territory with the title of master or
proprietor, neither shall he in future acquire any property therein."35 This
prohibition, too, was not racist in that it sought to eliminate a privilege, for
it exempted those to whom the privilege had not belonged. Hence, "[tihe
preceding article cannot in the smallest degree affect white woman who
have been naturalized Haytians [sic] by Government, nor does it extend to
children already born, or that may be born of the said women. The
Germans and Polanders naturalized by government are also comprized
[sic] in the dispositions of the present article."36
The Haitian Constitution ventured deeper than most into the area
of private morality, but the adventure was not one of regulation. Rather,
it affirmed a set of social norms over others in the interest of justice and
equality. For instance, because the slave's private life had been at the
33. Id. art. 3.
34. The scenario implied here contrasts with developments in the U.S. See Magali
Bessone, Building American Citizenship: A Matter of Rights or Races?, 57 INT'L SOCIAL
Sci. J. 113-115 (2005) (discussing how and positing why rights and citizenship, in the
early history of the United States, were reserved only for those who were "White of Anglo-
Saxon origin").
35. 1805 HAITI CONST. art. 12.
36. Id. art. 13.
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slave master's discretion, Haitians thought it necessary to give it
constitutional protection. Accordingly, marriage was declared "an act
purely civil, and authorized by the government"37 for all. Likewise, the
law-and not the slave master-"authorises [sic] divorce in all cases
which shall have been previously provided for and determined."38 The
constitutionality of marriage and divorce are set out in the General
Disposition of the 1805 Constitution, a section that contains much of the
rights reserved under the U.S. Bill of Rights, with notable distinctions:
4. The armed force is essentially obedient: no armed
body can deliberate.
5. No person shall be judged without having been legally
heard in his defense.
6. The house of every citizen is an inviolable asylum.
7. It cannot be entered but in case of conflagration,
inundation, reclamation from the interior, or by virtue of
an order from the emperor, or from any other authority
legally constituted.
8. He deserves death who gives it to his fellow.
9. Every judgment to which the pain of death or corporal
punishment is annexed shall not be carried into
execution until it has been confirmed by the emperor.
10. Theft shall be punished according to the
circumstances which may have preceded, accompanied
or followed it.
11. Every stranger inhabiting the territory of Hayti [sic]
shall be, equally with the Haytians [sic], subject to the
correctional and criminal laws of the country.
12. All property which formerly belonged to any white
Frenchmen, is incontestably and of right confiscated to
the use of the state.
37. Id. act 14 (note that the document contains separately numbered "articles" and
"acts").
38. Id. act 15.
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13. Every Haytian [sic], who, having purchased property
from a white Frenchman, may have paid part of the
purchase money stipulated in the act of sale, shall be
responsible to the domains of the state for the remainder
of the sum due.
14. Marriage is an act purely civil, and authorized by the
government.
15. The law authorises [sic] divorce in all cases which
shall have been previously provided for and determined.
16. A particular law shall be issued concerning children
born out of wedlock.
21. Agriculture, as it is the first, the most noble, and the
most useful of all the arts, shall be honored and
protected.
22. Commerce, the second source of the prosperity of
states, will not admit of any impediment; it ought to be
favored and specially protected.
23. In each military division a tribunal of commerce
shall be found, whose members shall be chosen by the
Emperor from the class of merchants.
24. Good faith and integrity in commercial operations
shall be religiously maintained.
25. The government assures safety and protections to
neutral nations and friends who may be desirous of
establishing a commercial intercourse with this island,
they conforming to the regulations and customs of the
country.
26. The counting houses and the merchandize of foreigners
shall be under the safeguard and guarantee of the state.39
39. Id. acts 4-16, 21-26.
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A number of other clauses in the Constitution supplement this list.
The first is that the drafters of the Haitian Constitution placed their
"explicit and solemn covenant of the sacred rights of man and the duties
of the citizen," not only "under the safeguard of the magistrates," but
also under the "fathers and mothers of families, the citizens, and the
army."40 They also intended this covenant to be universally binding, as
they recommended it to their successors and presented it "to the friends
of liberty [and] to philanthropists of all countries."41 This was a modern
gesture in the vintage of the Enlightenment, but the content of the
present Constitution stood apart from those in France and the United
States. In the previous Constitution and elsewhere, the drafters of the
Haitian Constitution had already pledged to guarantee access to all,
anciens libres and nouveaux libres alike, to the "Divine Bounty of
nature." They also swore to uphold that pledge as good fathers and
mothers would: "No person is worth of being a Haitian who is not a good
father, good son, a good husband, and especially a good soldier."42
Further, "[flathers and mothers are not permitted to disinherit their
children."43
V. CONCLUSION: CONCEPTIONS OF THE HUMAN AND OF RIGHTS
In nearly all political and philosophical traditions, the discourse of
human rights emerges in conjunction with a political economy of power,
authority, and ethics. As no tradition is truly uniform, generalizations
are always difficult. Therefore, before and after the Haitian Revolution,
traditions undoubtedly existed in the West that sought to protect
persons from political violence. From this perspective, the Haitian
Revolution was in fact truly forward-thinking in its trust and
instrumentality. Nonetheless, it did not merely mimic the intent and
purpose of other modern revolutions. The Haitian Revolution had the
singular feature of being instigated by agents who had previously
existed outside of the bonds of modern political compacts. They were
mere objects of sovereign decisions and economic transactions. This
singularity affected the course and outcome of events. Accordingly, the
Haiti Revolution was the first formal constitutional order of the trans-
Atlantic world dedicated to the protection of those orphaned by modern
political technologies, including constitutional orders, and the
structures of the global political economy. This revolution sought not
only to protect persons disinherited by law and constitution, but it also
40. Id. (language found in the penultimate paragraph preceding the signature block).
41. Id. (language found in the paragraph immediately preceding the signature block).
42. Id. art. 9.
43. Id. prelim. decl. art. 10.
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stipulated explicit commitment to those cast by modern morality and
legal dispositions as illegitimate: children, divorced women, white
women in illicit relations with blacks, and all those deprived of
constitutional protection from the sovereign. It was also the first to
protect the resources of life, and life itself, as a necessary requirement of
the security pledged by the state to its citizenry without preference or
discrimination.
The ultimate purpose of this article was not, however, to extol the
virtues of the Haitian Revolution. It was to demonstrate that human
rights have multiple genealogies, and it is possible, as often happens in
the Global South, to imagine protected human rights as existing outside
of Western norms, without negating the possibility of universalism or
universality, which is the appeal of the concept of human rights. The
Haitian Revolution best makes this point because the event was a
defiant response to the French and American revolutions. The former
also vindicates an ascendant point today that intuition, affect, and
experience are not necessarily counterproductive, as they may lead to
wisdom and good decision where reason, science, and rationality may,
and did, fail.
These three revolutions offered three models of political subjectivity
and three spheres of freedom based on three conceptions of what it
means to be human. However, neither one of the three has completely
served any society well. After all, once the Civil War had ended, the
United States universalized-more accurately, nationalized-the equal
protection of the law, thereby extending constitutional norms to its
black populations and other minorities. In this and moments such as
the New Deal, the United States converged toward redistributive justice
that emerged in Haiti long before it was an acceptable liberal orthodoxy.
The French also diluted their republican ideals to accommodate
both liberalism and pressures for a modicum of redistributive justice
under the Third Republic. The challenge was met by the Solidarists,
who, under the leadership of Leon Gambeta and Jules Ferry, expanded
education, the arts, and political access to most citizens in both the
metropole and the colonies. The Solidarists thus experimented with the
first true welfare state in the modern world.
Haiti, unfortunately, underwent political turmoil, occupation, and
dictatorship. None of these events were the result of Haiti's
constitutional ambitions. They were the final manifestations of an
imperialism France, the United States, and their local allies foisted on
Haiti to preserve so-called acquired interests. Even so, the Haitian
stipulations of rights prefigured the norms that apply today to the
stateless, refugees, internally displaced, trafficked women, prostitutes,
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the homeless, and those who suffer from sovereign violence and the
violence of the global political economy.
The second objective of this article was to undermine the claims that
rights descended on the modern world from generations of Western
thinkers to the rest. The Western authorship has been plainly
debunked, but not the generational tale, a fact that can be seen in
discursive, albeit not normative, convergences. Was it not Georges
Jacques Danton, the father of respectable French republicanism who
stated before the French Legislative Assembly on August 13, 1793, that
"[a]fter bread, education is the primary need of the people"?44 Is there
any need universally more basic to human existence than bread and
shelter? Is not the natural body the primary object of politics and
primary stake of all politics? To the extent that these are true, a
simulacrum of intelligent debate has occurred in the West since the
1966 United Nations debates. In 1975, this debate culminated at
Helsinki, where civil and political rights were determined to be the
essential human rights, while presumed socio-economic rights were
deemed secondary to them. It would be simpler to postulate this claim
as liberal position, but a truly implausible inversion has occurred here
in which the rights that are most required from birth to death-the
rights most needed when the social compact has dissolved or when the
sovereign disowns some entities-are now labeled socio-cultural. To
claim that political rights are universal and in urgent need of
application, while socio-economic rights are merely a matter of public
policy is, if nothing else, a bit disingenuous.
The so-called socio-economic rights are in essence the ones that
unqualifiedly apply to all humans regardless of their status, social
origins, or relations to a sovereign. With the faculties they aspire to
protect and the capacities they seek to enhance, the misnamed socio-
political rights are the one category of rights that are truly universal
human rights. The dispositions of the Haitian Revolution would thus be
universally acclaimed today if jurists, lawyers, and others had the
courage and the imagination to rise above the authorized societal order.
44. This quote is attributed to Danton by the inscription on his statue on Boulevard St.
Germain in Paris dedicated to him in 1903.

